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INTRODUCTION 
The purpose of this paper is to 
analyze the position of the United 
States in opposing the adoption by the 
United Nations of a definition of aggres· 
sion. 
Several related factors are considered 
germane to a discussion of the problem 
as it is stated. First, the position of the 
United States regarding the criminality 
of aggressive war is examined in order 
that the moral position of the United 
Statl's ran he deterlllinrd. It ig not 
ron~itll'n'd within lhl' ~l'ope of thi~ 
trratmcnt to atltlrc8s lhl' queslion of lhl' 
legality of aggressive war, but merely to 
l'llJl~itll'r the plllil'Y 1'~l'lIl1:;l't1 hy the 
Unitcd Stales on the suhject. 
I n an aLtemp t to provide an overview 
of the multitudinous definitions extant 
in the world community, a short resume 
of the early definitions is presented 
together with representative examples 
of the two major types of definition. No 
attempt is made to deal extensively with 
the vagaries of the many definitions 
promoted by the individual nations of 
the world. 
The Soviet definition presents the 
:.,rrl'nlrst dcpnrture 'from thl' norllls of 
l'urn'nt pral'lit'l' in till' lInitl't1 Nati(ln~ 
and nppl'ar:; to hc eurrcntly favorcd hy a 
rather large percentage of the United 
Nnlions memhership. In ordcr lo nppre· 
eiate the potential effect upon U.S. 
policies, past and present, the subStance 
of the definition is considered in juxta-
position to both the general nature of 
U.S. foreign policy actions and to' 
specific examples of past episodes in-
volving the international use of force by 
the United States. 
Finally, an attempt is made to illus-
trate how the application of the ele-
ments of the Soviet definition in cases 
of suspected aggression may operate 
against the interests of the United States 
within the United Nations. 
I-·AN OLD ISSUE REVISITED 
The Soviet Resolution. In December 
1967 the 22d United Nations General 
Assembly considered a resolution, sub-
mitted by the Soviet Union, which again 
placed the que~tion of defining aggres-
sion before the United Nations: 
Convinced that a primary problem 
confronting the United Nations in the 
maintenance of international peace re-
mains the strengthening of the will of 
States to respect all obligations under 
the Charter, 
Considering that there is a widespread 
conviction that a definition of aggrcs· 
sion would have considerable impor-
tance for the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and for the adoption of 
cHeetivc meab"llreS under Ihe Charter 
for preventing acts of 3{!gression. 
Notillg that there is still no generally 
recognized definition of aggression, 
1. Recognizes that there is a wide-
spread conviction of the need to ex-
pedite the definition of aggression; 
2. Establislles a Special Committee 
on the Question of Defining Aggres-
sion. composed of thirty· five Mcmber 
States to be appointed by the President 
of the General Assembly, taking into 
consideration the principles of equit-
able geographical represcntation and 
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the necessity that the principal legal 
systems of the world should be repre-
sentcd: 
,~. Requests the ~ccn'tary-Gcncral 
to provitle thc Spl'cial COllllni!tl'c with 
till' I\l'('cssary faciliti('s anti R'n'ices: 
5. Decides to includc in thc pro-
visional agcnda of its twcnty-third scs-
sion thc itcm cnlilktl "Rcport of thc 
Special Committcc on the Question of 
Defining Aggression." 1 
A letter from the Minister for For-
eign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. had pro-
posed inclusion of the resolution on the 
agenda. This letter contained a series of 
statements that smacked of the usual 
Soviet propaganda, but to many nations 
of the world community the proposals 
seemed to reflect an accurate exposition 
of the problems weighing upon the 
conscicncc of the "law-abiding" nation-
statcs. Thc Soviets proclaimed " ... of 
late, there have been increasing in-
stances of the use of armed force to 
commit acts of aggression against sover-
eign States and to crush peoples strug-
gling against colonialism and for frec-
dom and indcpendcnce." The Russians 
continued by stating that acts of aggres-
sion were undermining peace and 
security and increasing the danger of the 
outbreak of a new world conflict. "In 
conjunction with the vigorous condem-
nation of aggression and the adoption of 
measures preventing it, the formulation 
of a definition of aggression could, 
particularly in the present international 
situation, make an important contribu-
tion to the cause of peace." The pro-
posed definition would be "a stern 
reminder to the forces of agl,'Tcssion and 
wlIr Ih1l1 Ilwy III'1Ir r('~pon~iJ,ilily for 
violllLing intcrnalionlll pcaee."2 
In the debate that followed, the 
Soviet delegate noted with regret that in 
previous United Nations sessions the 
adoption of the Soviet draft definition 
of aggression had been blocked by the 
United States and added, "lIad there 
been a unh'ersally recognized definition 
of aggression, the American interven-
tionists would find it far more difficult 
to mask their crimes in Viet Nam ... " 
since Vietnam was in no position to 
pose a threat to the security of thc 
lInill'd Slllll's. 'I'll(' Sovil'l rl'prc~senlnlivl! 
poin",d out lhlll his ('olllltry had 1)(,I'n a 
ehampion of a clear-cut definition of 
a/!I,'Tession since the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference. Scveral countries, he con-
tinued, had thwarted the good inten-
tions of the Soviet Union in order to 
further their own selfish interests of 
intervention in the affairs of other 
countries and trying to suppress the 
people's wars of liberation.3 
A total of 28 nations entcred the 
subscquent debate on the subject. The 
Soviet satellites addcd their usual itera-
tion of the party line. but, in addition, 
many other delegaLcs to the assemhly 
spoke out in favor of the Soviet resolu-
tion. A brief summary of some aspects 
of the debate illustrating typical argu-
ments is presented below. 
Africa. Algeria argued that it was 
essential to define the general principles 
of the Charter more closely ancl added 
that international tension had heen 
artificially created to block the advance 
of colonial peoples to independence. 
This situation had led to major conflicts 
such as in the Dominican Republic, 
Vietnam, and the t\liddle East. Any 
policy which reward cd thc aggressor, 
according to the Algerian delcgalc. 
would ::,pell thc suil'ide of thr lInilt'cl 
Natiolls. The Algerian argulllent ellclccl 
by pointing out that the definition of 
aggression would complete the listing of 
principles of international law dealin/! 
with anll governing friendly relaliolls 
and cooperation.4 
The ))emocratic Hcpuhlic of thc 
Congo also favored definition. but thcy 
felt that any attempt would be inade-
quate unless it included prohibition of 
forms of aggression such as propaganda 
and assistance to armed rcbel hands 
operating against anothcr Statc. as wcll 
as prcssure on the State and passive or 
active assistance to armed rebel bands 
operating against the political or eco-
nomic institutions of thc Statc or 
il!!ainl't ils nalurill n'sourccs.a The 
Sovit't tll'finilion, tli~l'u~I'11 in Chapl!'r 
111. pnwi,h's l'rill'ria n,fl'rrl'd to hy llll' 
COIlI!0h':'I' ddl'!!iltion. 
J,ihcria, too, favored a definition, 
cven though past cfforts had provcd 
fruitless. The delegate added that since 
thc last attcmpt was made, in 1957, thc 
mcmbership of the United Nations had 
incrcascd appreciahly and should pro-
vide a bctter environment for defining 
aggression.6 
The Middle East. The rcprcsentative 
of Iran argucd for the definition and 
enumerated two principles that had 
promptcd thc carlicr quests for dcfini-
tion: first, to univcrsalizc thc principlcs 
of thc Nurclllhcrg trials; mill sccond, to 
strcngthen thc basis of judgmcnt CIII-
ploycd by the organization for the 
maintenance and restoration of interna-
tional peace and security. lIe continued 
by noting that although the search for 
definition had lain dormant for scveral 
years, the Gcneral Asscmhly and 
Sccurity Council had both entered upon 
paths which were more likely to lead to 
an acceptable and feasible definition.7 
Thc Iraqi delegation adopted a policy of 
wholehearted endorsemcnt of the Sovict 
resolution which could provide a key to 
prcvcnling the crosion and collapse of 
inll'rnalional onlrr, if it mil!hl lead lo 
an al'l'l'ptablc ilnd pr!'cise dl'finition of 
a/!gression. The Syriiln Arab Bepuhlic 
voiced similar sentiments, adding that 
argulllcnts against the proposal were a 
reflection of the desire of certain 
fHlw1'rs til safl:gllllni their tll'lfish intl:r-
csts and to cnsure that force would 
prcvail over law.a 
The represcntative of Afghanistan 
said that a definition would help the 
Sccurity Council in its deliberations. 
Asia. India welcomcd the initiative of 
the Soviet llnion in brinl!ing the mattcr 
bcfore thc United Nations, pointing out 
that collective security was vital to the 
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smaller nations, and everything possible 
must bc done to strengthen the system. 
Tlw definilion of aggression woultl he, 
:1l'l'Ortlill!! 10 Ihl' hllliilll tll'I!'!!:!Il', II 
\\llrlhwhill' sll'p in thaI llin'l'lilln. TIll' 
Indians fdt Ihat the rc:!:;on the «<Hi7 
dclinilion was not :Hlopted WilS to pro-
vide thc many new memhcrs of th(: 
organization an opportunity to consider 
thc matter and offer their views. The 
time had now comc for rcsuming work 
on a definition of aggression.9 
Camhodia presented an argument 
similar to that of India, hut notcd that 
the lack of a dcfinition enablcd thc 
United States to perpetrate crimes all 
over the world against thosc who dared 
to reject its domination) 0 Thc Philip-
pines favored adoption of an objective 
definition and urged the Assembly to 
move ahead with the task. Thailand 
indicated that a definition would be 
beneficial but doubted that the time 
was right for an attempt, and China also 
spoke out a/!ainst definition. 
Westem Hemisphere. The represcn-
tative of l\lexico said his government 
had always held that a definition of 
aggression was legally and technically 
feasible, and the result would he useful 
and appropriate. The delegation an-
nounced thal a dcfinite decision on the 
l/uestion could he taken up at the 24th 
SCl'Sion.l 1 Cuha echoed the ~oviet con-
tention that a definition was bl'in)! 
hIOl'k(~d hy states ('ngal!cd in a!!l--'fl's:,ion 
and who wcre not interested in anything 
which might contrihute to its eOlldem-
nation. 
The United States Stands Alone. TI\(' 
U.S. representative argued that since his 
delegation surmised that the Soviet item 
was pure propaganda, he had opposcd 
the proposal. The delegate then pointed 
out that our involvemcnt in Vietnam 
was in the rolc of a dcfender against 
aggression ami that the United States 
had proposed that the matter be de-
bated in the Security Coullcil. In con-
trast to ils slaled b('nr\'oll'nt eOIlCI'f11 
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for world order. the 1l.~.~.IL had em-
harked on a program of aggression 
eomllll'nein~ in I ();~:~ with tlw inl:or-
porati(lII of E:4onia. I.ilhuania. lIIlIl 
I.alvi<l inlo I he ~o\'il'l linion. Thi:, \\'01:' 
followl'd by the suhVl'r:.'ion of C)I;('l'ho-
slovakia in 1 (HB, the ai(lin~ and ahellin~ 
of the Korean inva:;ion of 1950, and the 
suppression of a free government of 
Hungary in 1956. All of these aggressive 
actions were perpetrated by a nation 
which had since 1933 favored an inter-
national definition of aggression. The 
United States closed its argument by 
stating that it would he glad to discuss 
the Soviet proposal in the proper forum, 
which was not thc General Assembly, 
but in the Sixth Committce. 
Considcring the entire debate, a total 
of 22 nations spoke out in favor of the 
Sovict proposal to pursue the quest for 
defining aggression and were generally 
in favor of the Soviet draft definition. 
Of those who entered the debate, an 
additional eight favored definition but 
preferred a broader abstract definition, 
and one preferred a 1I10re comprehen-
sive version of the Russian proposal. A 
total of only six nations, the United 
States, United Kingdom, Chilla, Nor-
way, Canada, and Australia spoke out 
against definition. 
In the (;eneral Assemhly votc on the 
~ovil't propo"al an O\'l'rwlll'lmin~ ma-
jority of ()O nalion:.' voll'd for thl' 
rl':.'olution--I B ab:.'lainl'd from v()tin~-­
and a single nation, the United States, 
voted ap;ainst adoption of the measure'. 
Tlw illlplieations of thi!> votl" al-
Ihou:!h drama til:, do not nl'I'I':-;:-;arily 
suggest thaI the United States is Ulll'l) ui-
vocally opposed to discussions of the 
definition of aggression, hut emphasize 
the fact that the U.S. policy has gener-
ally been oriented against the Soviet 
policy of pressing for a definition of 
aggression. 
This latest incident in the (;eneral 
Asscmhly dot'S S('1'\'1' to revivify th(' 
l'ontinui;llT da:.'h of :'m'il'l and llnill'd r 
~t<ltl'S inter!':.'t:.' in the political and II'I~al 
aspects of defining ap;gression and again 
opl'n!> the IJIII'stion of whdlll'r the: U.S. 
plllil"~, in Ihl' I'onl I"" I or 1111' I'urn'nt 
world :,ilualion, i:, Hllill iu OPI"):,iu/!. 
almo:-;t :,inl!"'han(h,(l\y, L1I1' propOSI'" 
!-'o"ict dcfinition or a:rp;rl':'sion. 
II--CIUi\lIN ALlTY 0 F 
AGGRESSIVE WAR--
TilE UNITED STATES POLlCY 
In addressing the question of for-
mally defining aggression in the context 
of the larger foreign policy of the 
United States, it is first necessary to 
examine the question of aggressive war 
and the U.S. policy on that subjcet. In 
general, United Nations actions arc 
recommendatory in nature and not 
hinding on the parties involvcd. This is 
particularly true in the case of perlna-
nent members of the Sccurity Council, 
since the only action that could be 
taken against them, assuming the usc of 
the veto power, would he hy the 
General As~emhly under the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution: 
[The United Nations] provides for the 
organization of collective force to frus. 
trate aggression whenever the great 
powers arc unanimously disposed to 
support such action; but it docs not 
create an enforeemcnt mcehanism 
capable of being used to control great 
powers or states backed by !,'feat 
powers) 
Even though :;anction:.' could not he 
forced on the United States hy th(' 
Assemhly, the U.S. (;overllml:nl ha~ 
consistently mainlained the posilion, at 
least on the surface, that it must he 
"morally" correct in int('rnaliolwl deal-
ings. As the principal driving force in 
the' founding and nurturinl-( of the 
organization, the United States must 
maintain an appearance of allegiance to 
the principles and goals of its Charter. 
Secretary of State Rusk defined our 
concepts of U.S. policy in the Unitcd 
Nations by stating that our I-(oals, in 
part, were "Security through Stren{!;th: 
to deter or defeat G{!{!'cssion at any 
level, whether of nuclear attack or 
limited war or subversion and guerilla 
tactics," and "Community undcr Law: 
to assist in tIll' :..rradual emer~cnce of a 
gl'lIIline world l'ommunily, basl'd on 
coopcration and luw ... "2 
President Johnson cllunciuted the 
official view of the I !nilell Stutes whcn 
hc stutea, "We support the United 
Nations as the hest instrument yel 
devi~cd to promote the pcuce of the 
world ... "3 
Since the Unitcd States is firmly 
committed to upholding lhe purposes of 
the United Nations, a definition of 
aggression could have serious implica-
tions in the conduct of its foreign policy 
if, in fact, the Unitcd States has cstab-
lished a firm policy on lhe outlawing of 
wars of aggression. Although many indi-
vidual statements of Govrrnmcnt of-
ficials have alluded to a denunciation of 
altgressive war, a hrief examination of 
the background and chronology of 
events germane to the matter will estah-
li~h a morc definite determination of 
U.S. policy. The criminality of aggres-
sive war is a suhjeet 0'1 continuing 
discussion by the world legal com-
munity, and the legal aspects of a 
definition are not within the scope of 
this treatment. The subject can be 
approached, however, from a discussion 
of the record of the United States in 
malll'rs im'olving altp:rcssivc war and as 
c\ idelll'l,d hy polil'), proIllHlIll't'ml'nts. 
Prior to the 20th ccnturv, the United 
Statcs maintained a relati~ely dormant 
posture on the consideration of the 
criminality of aggressivl~ war. The lad, 
of early interest wus not founded on a 
lack of experience in warfare. As 
pointed out by (,luincy Wright, "The 
United States, which has, perhaps some-
what unjustifiubly, prided itself on its 
peacefulness, has had only twenty years 
during its entire history when its army 
or navy has not heen in active opemtion 
during some days, somewhere. ",~ 
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Perhaps the first steps in the manifes-
tation of official U.S. policy on the 
suhject were the Hague Conventions of 
] 899 and 1907 and the Geneva Conven-
lions of 1929. These eonventions made 
no alll'mpts at dl'lilllilalion of IIII' I"p:al 
aspcds of war it~c1r. Bulthc nuLion~ did 
agree "before an appeal to arms ... to 
have recourse, as far as circunistances 
allow, to the good offices or mediation 
of one or more friendly powers."5 The 
humanitarian principles set forth in the 
treaties were definite first steps toward 
the eventual prohibition of aggressive 
war as an element of U.S. policy. 
In 1928 the United States made two 
significant moves toward the denuncia-
tion of aggressive war. In February a 
resolution of 21 American Republics, 
including the United States, resolved at 
the Sixth (Havana) Pan-American Con-
ference that " ... war of aggression 
constitutes an international crime 
against the human species."6 More im-
portantly, the Pact of Paris, Letter 
known as the Kellogg-Briand Pact, 
signed on 27 August 192B by the 
United States, Great Britain, Germany, 
France, Japan, Italy, Poland, Belgium, 
and later by 11 total of 63 nations, 
provided a seemingly definitive concrete 
condemnation of war and called upo.n 
all parties to "renounce it as an instru-
ment of national policy in their rela-
tions to one another."7 
Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Secretary of 
State and an internationally respected 
lawyer, in 19:32 enunciated the Ameri-
can interpretation of thc Kellogg-Briand 
Pact: 
War betweell lIations was renoulleed 
by the si!!nalories of the Briant!-
Kellogg Treaty. This means that it has 
become illegal throughout practically 
the entire world. It is no longer to be 
the source and subject of rights. It is 
no longer to be the principle around 
which the dutics, the conduct, and the 
rights of nations revolvc. It is an illegal 
thing. Hcrcaftcr whcn two nations en-
gagc in armed conflict eithcr onc or 
both of thcm must bc wrong.doers--
violators of this gcneral treaty law. We 
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no longer draw a circle about them and 
treat them with the punctilios of the 
duelist's code. Instead, we denounce 
them as law-breakers. By that very act, 
we have madl' obsoletc many Ic:::al 
prc('('(It'nts ant! han- :::in'n th(' It':::al 
profl'$.<ion III(' ta~k of f('('x:IIninin::: 
many of its codes and tr('alil's.1I 
The legislative branch of the United 
States had previously conllnitted itself 
to the outlawry of war when on 12 
December 1927 the Senate adoptcd a 
resolution introduced by Senator Wil-
liam E. Borah which contained the 
dictum, "that is the view of the Senate 
of the Unitcd States that war between 
nations should be outlawed as an insti-
tution or means of settlement of inter-
national controversies by making it a 
public crime under the law of na-
tions.''9 
The interpretation of Secretary Stim-
son and Senator Borah was by no means 
universal. The world legal community 
did not unanimously consider the pact 
as an international criminal code. Mr. 
Kellogg implies that the treaty bearing 
his name gives the nations involved the 
right to determine their own guilt or 
innocence in matters involving a viola-
tion of the treaty: "Every nation is frce 
at all times and regardless of treaty 
provisions to defend its territory from 
attack or invasion, and it alone is 
competent to decide whether circum-
stances require recourse to war in self-
defense."10 
The gencral disagreement over the 
viahility of thc pact as a source of law 
centcred on the lack of sanctions in the 
systcm to deal with violators of the 
pacl. Thl' stlnelion of world opinion was 
not ('onsidered adeq lIate in giving the 
pact the characteristics requisite of a 
substantive elcmcnt of the law of na-
tions. Lautcrpacht held that "This 
'epoch-making' document L the Kcllogg-
Briand Pact] thus could not really be of 
any lcgal significance for the future 
validity of the law of neutrality; there 
wcre not even any tcchnical difficulties 
arising from it in this connection. "11 
The International Law Association, 
in recognition of the divergent opinions 
of international legal scholars and, in 
partieular, the l'OII1:l'rn of tlw lInih'rI 
~tat('s O\'('\' th(, lad .. of (1"f1nith'" "n-
fon"'J\I('nt 1II,'aSlI\'('S intl'insil' 10 llll' 
pact, adopted a serics of resolutions at 
its confcrence in Budapest on 10 Sep-
tember 19:H. Thcsl~ resolutions arc 
known as the "Budapest Articles of 
Interpretation." They read in part: 
(2) A signatory State which threat-
ens to resort to anned force for the 
solution of an international dispute or 
conflict is guilty of a violation of the 
Pact. 
(4) In the event of a violation of the 
Pact by a resort to ann cd force or War 
by one signatory State against another, 
the other States may, without thereby 
committing a breach of the Pact or of 
any rule of International Law, do all or 
any of the following things:--
(a) Refuse to admit the exereise by 
the State violating the pact of bellig-
erent rights, such as visit and search, 
blockade, etc. 
(b) Decline to observe towards the 
State violating the pact the duties 
prescribed by International Law, apart 
from the pact, for a neutral in relation 
to a belligerent; 
(c) Supply the State attacked with 
financial or material assistance, includ· 
ing munitions Of war; 
(d) Assist with anned forces the 
State attacked.12 
These interpretations tended to solidify 
the substance of the pact and enforced 
the U.S. policy proscribing international 
use of force. 
Prior to the advcnt of World Wur 11, 
the policy of the United States regard-
ing the criminality of war was weIl 
estahlishcd, and the Ic!!al eontlmt of lhl' 
policy was extended to the addre8sing 
of the legal ramifications of aid to 
victims of aggression. NaturalIy, the 
United States adopted the philosophy 
that since wars of aggression were repug-
nant to the international community, 
aid to the victims was a logical reaction 
of the government. The general policy 
as stated by Hobert II. .Jackson. then 
Attorney General of the United States, 
was: 
Present aggressive wars arc civil wars 
against the intrmational connnunity. 
Al'eordingly. as fI'spllnldblt, IIIrlllbrrs 
of that eOllllllllllily. WI' ran tfl'at vii-· 
tinlS of aggression in the Satl1l~ way we 
treat legitimate governments when 
there is civil strife and a state of 
in~llrgeney··that is to say. we an~ JlI'r-
miHed to give to defendi~ goven!-
ments all the aid we ehoose.13 
Mr. Stimson, Secretary of War at that 
time, testifying before the House Com-
mittee on Foreign Affairs with respect 
to the proposed lend-lease bill, pointed 
out that the United States was primarily 
rcsponsible for the increasing recogni-
tion of the criminality of aggressive war, 
but added that " .•. It has not been 
recognized ... by these Houses of Con-
gress here that were the parents of it, 
what a vital change was made in the 
system of international law by that 
action." The significance of the U.S. 
leadership against aggressive war was not 
largely appreciated by Congress or the 
public.l 4 
World War II and its widespread 
destruction gave renewed impetus to the 
need for a true international world legal 
system with potent international organi-
zation to maintain the force of law ovcr 
the law of force. The loss of life from all 
sources during World War II was esti-
mated to be over GO million.l 5 Cer-
tainly the advent of nuclear weapons 
assured a potential population destruc-
tion increase of at least an order of 
magnitude in the "m:xt" general war. 
The legal aftermath of the Second 
World War was initiated hy the precc-
(h·"t-~elling Nurt·mherg trial:;. It ~I\()uhl 
be notcd, however, that the punishment 
of defeated leaders was not "illegal" or 
without precedent. In 405 B.C. the 
Lacedaemonian Admiral Lysander, after 
the destruction of the Athenian Fleet, 
called his allies together to determine 
the fate of his prisoners. The council of 
allies was similar to a court which heard 
witnesses and examined the evidence 
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before arriving at a judgment and sen-
tence. All prisoners, except one, were 
sentenced to death. 
The precedent of the Nurcmberg 
Irial,.; wa,.; Iht' nlh'mpl 10 ('~Inhli,.;h a 
,.;uh:::lanli"e rule of law. makin!! ag!!n',.;-
sive war a crime for which individuals ' 
could be held accountable and pun-
ished. This had the effcct of cstablishing 
in world opinion the principle that 
justice and law had triumphed over the 
law of force. The promise of Winston 
Churchill, made on 8 September 1942, 
was destined to be consummated by the 
Nuremberg trials: 
... Those who arc guilty of Nazi 
crimes will have to stand up before 
tribunals in every land where the 
atrocities have been eommiHed. in 
order that an indelible warning may be 
given to future ages and that successive 
generations of men may say, "S60 
perish all who do the like again." 1 
[Emphasis supplied] 
The Nuremberg tribunal and its char-
ter provided the United States with an 
impressive step forward in its quest to 
codify the criminality of war. The 
United States chose as its chief represen-
tative Robert H. Jackson, Associate 
Justice of the SI\preme Court and for-
mer Attorncy General, who had long 
been a proponent of increased emphasis 
on codification of the criminal aspects 
of war. In an address to the Inter-
American Bar Association at Havana on 
27 i\larch 19·~7, ~Ir. Jackson as At-
torney General said: 
... No longer can it be argued that the 
civilized world must behave with rigid 
impartiality toward both an aggressor 
in violation of the treaty and the 
vietilllS of unprovoked aHaek. We need 
not now be indifferent as between the 
worse and the better cause, nor deal 
with the just and the unjust aIike.l7 
Mr. Jackson had rather broad official 
guidelines for his task as U.S. Represen-
tative to the International Conference 
on Military Trials which commenced in 
June 1945. The guidelines included (1) 
The i\Ioscow Declaration, which formed 
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the immediate basis for the establish-
ment of the International Military 
Tribunal, and the charter. This declara-
tion established the general guidelines 
for the trials and madc provh~ions to Lry 
major war criminals, noL in national 
courts, but by "joint dccision" of allicd 
governments; and (~) the Yalta i\lemo-
ran dum, addressed to the Prcsidcnt of 
the United States, which established 
U.S. overall policies and guidelincs in 
the conduct of war crimes trials. It 
included delineation of the crime to be 
considered by the tribunal and provided 
a base date of 1933 as the beginning of 
German criminal actions. The memoran-
dum also included guidelincs for select-
ing and identifying those to be punished 
and the difficulties that might be en-
countered in identification. The docu-
ment ended with a recommended pro-
gram for trying the criminals. Of par-
ticular importance is the emphasis on 
the aspect of making an authentic 
record of German crimes. 
In the proceedings of the conference 
the U.S. representative adopted a singu-
lar policy: to make the chartcr of the 
International Military Tribunal and the 
proceellings of the trials themselves 
stand as a massive fralllework for the 
dcvclopment and codification of suh-
stantive international criminal law. The 
Russian delegate, Gen. LT. Nikitchenko, 
adopted the philosophy that trials were 
of a purely ephemeral nature, desi{!ned 
to inflict sUlIlmary punishment on the 
bcatcn Nazis. In thc ddihcratiolU; on the 
language of the charter, Nikitchenko 
made the following pronouncemcnt re-
/!anling the U.S. propol.'al for the ddini-
tion of war criminals: "In my opinion 
we should not try to draw up this 
definition for the future ... "18 
II is general opinion regarding the 
legal substance of the charter, so impor-
tan t to .I ustice .T ackson, is indicated- in 
this statement of the Russian: "The fact 
that the Nazi leaders are criminals has 
already been established. The task of 
the Tribunal is only to determine the 
measure of guilt of each particular 
person and mete out the necessary 
punishmcnt--the sentences. "19 
Professor A.N. Trainin, of thc Soviet 
dl'll'/!aLion, also 1H'lil'vl'd LhaL LI,,' c'on-
l.'idl'raLion of the conft'f('nl:l' I.'hllulcl hc: 
limitcd Lo the task at hand and not he 
concern cd with providing futurc guid-
ance for international lawyers: "Thcrc 
might come a time when there wiII be a 
permanent international tribunal of the 
Unitcd Nations organization, hut this 
tribunal has a definite purpose in view, 
that is, to try criminals of the European 
Axis powers ... "20 
The French delegation, headed by 
Judge Robert Falco, generally adopted a 
policy of not accepting the principle of 
law that aggressive war constituted a 
defined criminal action. Professor Andre 
Gros, the assistant representative of 
France, set forth the basis of the French 
position when he said, "We clo not 
consider as a criminal viola tion the 
launching of a war of aggression. "21 ]n 
contrast to the United States, the 
Frenchmen did not desire to he associ-
ated with an attempt to formulate 
international law. The French represen-
tative pointed\ out that "We are not 
declaring a new principle of interna-
tional law. We are just dcclaring we are 
going to punish those responsible for 
criminal aets. "22 
The British representative, Sir David 
Maxwell Fyfe, sllccinctly stated the 
position of his government in this sLaLe-
ment, 
The question comes to this: wheth-
er it is right or desirable to accept thc 
position that a war of a~!-'I"cssion is a 
crimc. It secms to he :Igrccd that it i~. 
The fundamental difficulty is the lack 
'of sanction. i\lore smetly it may be 
said that it is acccpted as a erime 
without declared punishment or any 
declared sanetion against it.23 
This position was essentially parallel to 
that of the United States, and this 
parallelism was generally ohserved 
throughout the whole of the delibcra-
tions. 
1\,lr . .T ustice.J ackson, during the form-
ing of the charter. main tained his insis-
tence that the results of their efforts 
would fulfill the dual role of establish-
ing the guilt and selting the punishmenl 
of the Nazi hierarchy and of providing 
future legalists with a carefully prepared 
source of law rcflecting 'the policy of 
the Unitell Stale!>. lIe further empha-
sized the orientation of the United 
States by noting, "Our altitude as a 
nation, in a number of transactions, was 
based on the proposition that this (war] 
was an illegal war from the moment that 
it was started ... "24 
In his report to President Truman, 
Justice Jackson summarized his position 
concerning the development of law 
using the charter as a vehicle for estab-
lishing the criminality of aggressive war: 
This Pact constitutes only one in a 
series of acts which have reversed the 
viewpoint that all war is legal and have 
brought intemational Law into har-
mony with the eommon sense of man-
kind, that unjustifiable war is a 
crime .•. Any legal position asserted 
on behalf of the United States will 
have considerable signifieanee in the 
futUre evolution of Intemational 
Law.25 
The United States, a major partici-
pant in the drafting of the United 
Nations Charter, continued its position 
as a salient. force in the quest for 
establishing a legal basis for the out-
lawing of aggressive war. The provisions 
of the charter very nearly approach. at 
Icust theoretically, the complete suhju-
gation of aggressive war to the interna-
tional community. Signatories to the 
charter arc bound to "settle their inter-
national disputes hy I)(~aed\ll nwans" 
and to "refrain in their international 
relations from the threat of use of 
force •.. "26 
The Security Council was entrusted 
with the power to react, with the use of 
force if neccssary, to "any threat to the 
peace, breach of peace or acts of aggres-
sion."27 
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In summary, the policy of the United 
States during the 20th century has been 
one of continuing to press for recogni-
tion of the initiation of wars of aggres-
sion as an international crime. Our 
position was particularly strong during 
the deliherations for the development of 
the charter for the International Mili-
tary Tribunal, even though other partici-
pants in the' negotialions·-ltussia anl! 
France.-adopted a philosophy that the 
universal denunciation of agl,>Tessive war 
as an international crime was nol in 
consonance with the "facts of life" 
extant in the world political commu-
nity. 
III-DEFINITIONS OF AGGRESSION 
In Chapter II the policy of the 
United States regarding the illegality of 
aggressive war was surveyed, disclosing a 
continuing effort to preclude the legal 
use of force in the cause of aggression. 
The difficulties in characterizing the 
concept of aggression and in defining 
exactly who is the ag{,>Tessor in a singular 
episode have paralleled the development 
of the concept of outlawing aggressive 
war. 
The paradoxi~al nature of the proh-
lem can he illustrated by considering 
that in spite of apparent agreement 
among world leaders on the principle 
that ag6>Tessive war is a crime to be 
condemned by international law, the 
buildup of arms throughout the worid 
has continued at an unprecedented 
pace, and an almost continuous parade 
of armed conflicts have transited the 
pages of history in recent decades. The 
imbroglio has arisen from the fael thal 
the effects of agreement on the princi-
ple have been negated hy a widespread 
disagreement as to the meaning of "ag-
gression." No definition of the term has 
ever been aeeepled by the policymakers 
of the international community, and 
each "side" believes the other will 
couch its aggressive overtures in terms 
of repelling the aggressive designs of the 
"other side." 
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It is not a case of failing to attempt 
to arrive at a universal ab'Teement on the 
exact definition of aggression, but is 
rather that the continuing process has 
met with frustration hl'caust! of Ihl' 
widt' diwr/!t'I\('c of opinion on IIIl' 
a\'cn\l(':;, of approaeh 10 Ihe final prod-
uct. Gcnerally speakinl,'" the world com-
lIlunity is polarized 011 the subject, one 
camp being the "definers," the other 
the "nondefiners." The "definers" are 
further divided within their own group, 
as will he discusscd in Chapter IV. In 
thc critical matter of defining ag/,'Tes-
sion, the policy of the United States has 
heen of an ambivalent nature, initially 
on the side of the "definers" during the 
pre-United Nations period, then leading 
the "non definers" in the Unitlld Nations 
deliberations. A review of the develop-
ment of the circumstances leading to 
the current stalematc among diplomats 
and jurists must necessarily prccede an 
attempt to establish the dcsirability of a 
definition of agf,'Tcssion in the contcxt 
of the U.S. position as a world "supcr-
power." 
Early Views on War and Aggression. 
War and thc use of force have been an 
integral part of life on this planet since 
before the appearance of man and have 
only recently becn considered to be 
violations of legal order. Animal warfare 
probably bcgan well before the Paleo-
zoic Era as competition betwcen thc 
cytoplasmic cells for the nceessities of 
survival. As the sophistication of lifl' 
forms rose to the highcr levels of true 
animal life, so did the methods and 
techniques of warfare. The use of force 
in the allimal world can gerwrally lw 
eOIH;idcred to arise from rivalry for 
possession of some external ohjeet, 
from intrusion of a strangcr in the 
group, or from frustration of activity.! 
These hasic causes of "war" among 
animals remain in the legacy of man, 
bllt the arrival of man and his amazing 
intellectual capacity have added to thc 
causative factors lcading to thc usc of 
violence. Primitivc lIlan generally fell 
into four dcgrecs of militancy: 
... [1] the most unwarlike peoples 
who fi[!ht only in defellsc; [2 J the 
modrratrly warlike who fi[!ht for 
sport, ritual, rl'\'('II!!I', 1ll'f$llllal prt'"li!!I', 
or othl'r ~lll'ial purpll>'C; 1 :11 thl' lIIort' 
warlike who fight for economic pur-
pores (raids on herds, ex tension of 
grazing lands, hooty, slaves); and [,~] 
the most warlike of all who, in addi-
tion, fight for political purposcs (ex-
tension of empire, political prcstig~ 
maintenance of authority of rulers),~ 
As man became more civilized, the 
causes of war remained rather stable, 
but the techniques improved, and the 
impact of war became more universal in 
nature. In addition, war became the 
subject of intellectual exercises peculiar 
to the human race, which leads to the 
consideration of thc problcm of de-
fin in/! al,',1,'Tcssive war and forrrllliating 
rulcs for the identification of the aggrcs-
sor in a particular conflict. 
Early Definitions. The question of 
differentiating the "guilty" and the "in-
nocent" parties in cases involving the 
use of intcrnational force has heen 
considered by jurists of the world for 
centuries. Belli, in 15(,3, considered war 
illcgal "unless thcre is need for de-
fense."3 Grotius, in his definition, con-
sidered an aggressive attack one 
" ... launched with criminal ohjectives, 
e.g. murder, pillage, robbery, etc. "4 
In 1650, ~5 years after Crotius cnun-
ciated his definition. Hiehanl Zouehe 
said of war, " ... a lawful contention, 
that is, a contention movcd hy le/!iti-
mate authority and for a lawful 
cause."5 He then delineated the cau~eg 
which hc considercd lawful, "A lawful 
cause is an injury which it is allowed 
both to avenge and to rcpel, whence a 
war is said to be either of offemlt', or of 
defense; as Camillus in a declaration to 
the Gauls said, 'All things which heaven 
allows us to defend, it allows us to 
reclaim and to avcnge. "'6 
Toward the end of the 18th century, 
Christian Wolff in his book Jus CelltulII 
.l1ctllodo Scicl1tiJica PertractatulII con-
sidered tht' question of establishinl! a 
rule for making a distinction between a 
"ju:>t" mill an "unjust" war. lit! de-
sl'rilll'd I hn'l' ha:;il' ::ilual ion::, all\, 0111' 
ul' whit-h l'llIIld I'rm'itll' Ih,' ha:;i:;' for a 
"ju::I" war. Tl\(')' Wl'n' "( I) TIll' .. Uaill-
n\('nt of om"s OWII or Ih .. t which oll/!:ht 
to be one's own, (2) the establishing of 
seeurity, (3) the preventing of threat-
ened danger or the warding off of 
injury,"7 thus providing the perennial 
"loophole" for a potential aggressor to 
wage war in the guise of "preventing 
threatened danger." I3ynkershoek, a 
contemporary of Wolff, wrote that in 
his view only two causes could be 
considered grounds for labeling a war 
nonaggressive, " ... defense or the re-
covery of one's own."8 
III Ilw s:m\(' Iwriod olh,'r writers 
l'onsid,'n'd Ihat allY 1I1I"lIIpl 10 dl'fille 
th,' "a/!:~n'~or" or uujuf;1 party to a war 
was meaningless. In particulat:, II obbes 
said "in a war of all against all it is 
logical that nothing can be called un-
just, "9 and II all contended that 
" ... both parties to every war are 
regarded as being in identical legal posi-
tions, and consequently as being pos-
sessed of equal rights."lO The com-
ments of I lall generally reflected the 
mien of the 19th century when war and 
aggression were generally considered to 
be outside the realm of justice and 
intermltionallaw. 
iIIodem Definitions. COIILrastl'd to 
Lhe early writers. who aLLempted to 
defille the just party in a contention 
involving force, the 20th century legal-
ists lwve appJ'OadH'd Ihe pl'Ohl':m of 
deLer/llilling the ulljust party-·ur the 
"a~f.,'l"essor." Probably the earliest ex-
ample of a large f.,'l"OUp of slates al,'l"eeillg 
upon restrictions to war was the Con-
vention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Conflicts at the First 
Hague Conference of 1899, where the 
signatories a!,'l"eed to attempt mediation 
measures'before recourse to arms.!l 
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League of Nations. Only one refer-
ence to "aggression" was made in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations, in 
article I 0, which provided: 
TIle' 1I1l'1l111l'r,; or Ih,' 1."Ill!II" IIIlth'rl:I"" 
III n'~p"cI :11111 pn'~I'rvI' :1:' lll!aill~t I'X-
Il'rnal :ll!J..'TI':<siOIl Ihl' It'rrilorial ill"'g-
rily alld I'xillting pulilkai illllt-PI'lIIlt'IIl'" 
or :Ill 1l1(,ll1hl'~ or lhe Le:lglII'. III e:L<,' 
or any such aggression the council shall 
advise upon the means hy which this 
obligation shall he fuIrillcd.l 2 
The covenant, although calling upon 
its memhers to preserve the inte!,'l"ity of 
other memhers against aggression, did 
not specifically prohibit war if the 
correct "procedures" were followed. 
More specifically, war was allowed if 
certain delays, specified in article 12, 
had been observed: if the coulleil could 
not attain unanimous ab'l"eement ullder 
article 15; or if the war were waged 
against an adversary who had not ac-
ecpted the unanimous recommendation 
of the council. 
Even though the League of Nations 
did not provide a blanket ban on a~~es­
sive war, member statcs werc called 
upon to suppress aggression under the 
advice of the council. The interpretation 
of exactly what constituted the aggres-
sion of the covenant became the subject 
of concern in the international commu-
nity. As professor Sollll has written, 
"No civilized system of law is satisfied 
with a general prohibition of 'acts vio-
lating the interests of other persons,' 
but tries to enumerate the prohibited 
acts [trespass, larceny, murder] and to 
define in more precise terms the aggra-
vating and attenuating circumstances 
resulting in higher or lower punish-
ment."l3 
The Pact of Paris (Briand-Kellogg 
Pact) for the Denunciation of War as all 
Instrument of Policy decisively ou t-
lawed, by implication, aggressive war 
and provided additional impetus to the 
moves toward defining aggression. 
During the League's later years 
several attempts were made to formally 
define aggression, beginning. with the 
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Geneva Protocol of 1925 which in its 
definition of aggression included "a 
resort to war in violation of the under-
takings contained in the CovenanL." A 
different and more rigorous form of a 
definition was intToduced by the Soviet 
Union at the Disarmament Conference 
of 11):1:l, This d.-fillitioll, with vcry 
minor variations and additions, survivcd 
thc ~ucceediu~ :1;' years with neithl'r 
complete rejection nor adoption by thc 
world comlllunity. This Sovict defini-
tion of 193:1 is almost identical to the 
one submitted to the Gencral Assembly 
of the United Nations in 1953 and will 
not be quoted in detail at this point. It 
did, however, list five acts that would be 
considered as branding the first to com-
mit as an aggressor-.( 1) Declaration of 
war against another State, (2) Inva:>ion 
of another State without a dcclaration 
of war, (3) Bombardment of another 
State or attacking its land or sea forces, 
(4) Landing of forces within the terri-
tory of another State without permis-
sion or if permission was granted, failing 
to withdraw on request, and (5) Naval 
blockade of another State. This early 
definition failed to include the sixth act, 
which did appcar in postwar Soviet 
definitions--the support of armed bands 
organizcd in its own territory which 
invade the territory of anothcr State. 
Following the listing of aggressive 
acts, a series of situations were listed 
which could not be used as an "excu~e" 
for commission of the forbidden ac-
tions. This included attempts to protect 
either capital investments or a nation's 
own citizens in hack ward eountries.l 4 
The Leaguc of Nation:; did undertake 
the question of defining aggression dur-
ing thc preparation of the Treaty of 
Mutual Assistance by the Pcrmancnt 
Advisory Commission. The report did 
not directly addrcss the problem of 
defining aggression but did contain rc-
marks whieh eharacterizcd infiltration 
and invasion as acts of aggression and 
provided guidance on "si~s which be-
token an impending aggression" which 
were determined to be: 
(1) Organization on paper of industrial 
mobilization; 
(2) Actual organization of industrial 
mobilization; 
(3) Collection of stocks of raw rna-
tcrials; 
(,t) Organizing of war industrics; 
(5) Preparation for military mobiliza-
tion; 
(C,) Actual milit<!I)' mobilization; 
(7) Hostilities.15 
In the prewar period the United 
States was a signatory to several treaties 
which alluded to a definition of ag/,'Tes-
sion. Typical of these were the provi-
sions of the Declaration of Principles of 
Inter-American Solidarity and Coopcra-
tion adopted at the Intcr-Ameriean Con-
ference for the Maintcnance of Peace at 
Buenos Aires on 21 Dcccmber 19:16. In 
this declaration the following principles 
were adopted by the American Commu-
nity of Nations: 
(a) Proscription of territorial con-
qucst and that, in consequence, no 
acquisition made through violence shall 
be recognized; 
(b) Intervention by one State in the 
internal or external affairs of another 
State is condeJ\lned; 
( c) Forcible collection of pecuniary 
debts is illegal; and 
(d) Any difference or dispute be-
tween the American nations, whatever 
its nature or origin, shall" be settled by 
the methods of conciliation, or un-
restricted arbitration, or through 
opcration of international justicc.lC, 
Post War Policy_ Thc U.S. delegation 
proposed that a definition of aggression 
be included in the text of the Charter 
for the International l\lilitary Tribunals. 
This definition closely paralleled the 
Soviet 1933 version: 
An aggressor, for the purposes of 
this Article, is that state which is the 
first to eommit any of the following 
actions: 
(1) Declaration of war upon anothcr 
state; 
(2) Invasion by its armed forces, 
with or without a declaration of war, 
of the territory of another state; 
(3) Attack by its land, naval, or air 
forccs, with or without a declaration of 
war, on the territory, vessels, or air-
craft of another state; 
U) Naval blockade of the coasts or 
ports of anotlH'r stall'; 
(5) I'rovision of :;upport to anm'lI 
bands fonned ill its territory which 
have invaded the territory of anotllCr 
state, or refusal, notwithstrutwng the 
request of the invaded state, to take in 
its own territory, all measures in its 
power to deprivc those brutds of all 
assistanec or protection. 
No political, military, ceonomic or 
otltcr considerations shall servc as an 
excuse or justification for such actions; 
but exercise of the right of legitimate 
self-defense, that is to say, resistance to 
an act of aggression, or action to assist 
a state which has been subjected to 
aggression, shall not constitute a war of 
aggression.17 
An intriguing interlude in an interna-
tional' paradox was the insistence of the 
United States delegation on the inclu-
sion of the Soviet definition and the 
insistence by the Russian delegation not 
to provide a definition of aggression in 
the charter of the tribunal, albeit their 
own! 
Definitions in the United Nations. 
The Charter of the United Nations 
includes such terms as "threats to the 
peace," "breach of the peace," and "act 
of aggression," but does not attempt to 
further define or amplify these ambigu-
ous aud comprehensive terms. This was 
not un ovcrsi~ht, but lhc rrt'ull of a 
dcliberute action by the drafters, in 
spite of intensive pressure to define 
aggression. The primary proponent of 
this move to include a definition in the 
charter was Oolivia. This delegation suh-
mitted a proposal which would have 
required the Security Couneil to apply 
sanctions "immediately by colleetive 
action" when it found a state to be an 
aggressor in accordance with the follow-
ing terms: 
A statc shall be designated an ag-
gressor if it has committed any of the 
following acts to the detriment of 
anotlter statc; 
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(a) Invasion of another state's terri-
tory by armed forces. 
(b) Declaration of war. 
(c) Attack by land, sea or air forces, 
with or without declaratiou of war. 
(d) Support ~iv('n to arnll'd bands 
for !III' JlnrpO$(' of inva~ion. 
(e) Intervention in anothcr state's 
internal foreign affairs. 
(f) Rcfusal to submit the matter 
which has caused a dispute to the 
peaccful means provided for its settle-
ment. 
(g) Refusal to comply Witll a judi-
cial decision lawfully \?ronounced by 
an intcmational court)U 
Similar amendments were submitted 
by Czechoslovakia and the Philippines. 
The Bolivian proposul was supported 
by Colomhia, Guatemala, Iionduras, 
r-.lexico, Uruguay, Egypt, Iran, New 
Zealand, and the Philippines. All per-
manent members of the Council, except 
China, were opposed to lhe prop08ul 
and were supported by Czechoslovukia, 
the Netherlands, Norway, South Africa, 
White Russia, Chile, and Paraguay.1 9 
The generul argument against the pro-
posal was that while a definition of 
aggression was complex alHI difficult, 
"recognition of un act after it had been 
committed would be simple. "20 
The final debutc on the subject 
ended when a clear majority of the 
committee decided that a definition 
" ... went beyond the possibilities of 
this confercnce and the purpose of the 
Charter." The originullext was rctuincd, 
sallS definition, and the Council was left 
with "the entire decision as to what 
constitutes a threat to peace, a hreach 
of peace or an act of ag/.,rrcssion. "21 
The question of defining aggression 
lay dormant in the United Nations for 
several years, primarily since the "super-
powers" both had opposcd the inclusion 
of a definition in the charter. The break 
in the definitional silence occurred in 
1950 following the paralysis of the 
Security Council and the suhsequent 
"Uniting for Peace" resolution. Since 
the Assembly had no power to compel 
measures against a convicted ug/,rrcssor, 
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but depended upon the eonsent of the 
United Nations membership, an easily 
applied, clear-cut definitioll of a/!:.,rres-
sion was cOllsitll'red hy some of thl' 
memhers to he lIl'ec~ary to aS~lIn' 
unanimity in the Assemhly Ikcisions. 
The Sovid lInion revitali;t.ed tlll~ slIhjet:l 
of definition by slIhmiLling the sub-
stance of its draft definition of 193:1 (or 
consideration by the International Law 
Commission.22 
The Assemhly, rcsponsive to the 
widening demand for a formal approach 
to the problem of definition, appointed 
a special committee of US merllhers on 
the "C)lIestion of I )cfining Ag/.,rression" 
and instrucled the commiLlee to pro-
duce "draft definitions or draft statl'-
ments of the notion of a/!grcssion. "2:\ 
The report of this conlJlliltee (':;tah-
lishetl the ('xi:;tellc(' of two hasic ap-
proaches among those who favored defi-
nition-the "general" definition and the 
"enumerative" definition. 
The Soviet draft of the enumerative 
definition is practically identical to the 
1933 version espoused by the United 
Stales in 1945 during the Il\IT Charter 
negotiations. The Soviet delegate, not-
ing that aggressors perennially utili;t.cd 
the concept of "preventive war" or "self 
defense" as an excuse, proposed a listing 
of examples of direct aggression: 
The State which first comlllits one 
of the following aels: 
(a) Declaration of war against an-
othcr Statc; 
(b) Invasion by its armcd forces, 
even without a declaration of war, of 
the territory of another State; 
(c) BOlllhardlllellt hy its lalld, :;('a, 
or air forces of the territory of another 
Statc or the carrying out of a deliber-
a te attack on the ships or aircraft of 
the lallcr; 
(d) Thc landing or leading of its 
land, sea or air forces inside the boun-
daries of another State without the 
permission of thc govemment of the 
latter, or the violation of the condi-
tions of such pcmlission, partieulary as 
regards the length of thcir stay or the 
extent of the area in which they lIlay 
stay: 
(e) Naval blockade of the coasts or 
ports of anoUlCr State; 
(f) Support of armed bands or-
ganizt'd in its own tt'rriton' whit-h 
invadl' LlII' It'rritory of ano(h~'r :-;(all', 
or r('fusal, on lJ('ing f(''1\1('~l<'d hy LlII' 
invadl'd Slate, 10 take in its own 
lI'rritory any action within its power to 
deny such bands any aid or protec-
tion.24 
The Soviets then list a serie:; of 
episodes which arc considered to be 
forms of indirect aggression which 
would condemn a state which fll'st: 
(a) Encourages subversivc activity 
against another State (acts of terror-
ism, diversion, etc.): 
(b) Promotes the outbrcak of civil 
war within another State: 
(c) Promotes an intcrnal uplll'aval in 
another State or a re~~rsal of policy ill 
favor of the aggressor.-5 
Economic aggression included the fol-
lowing acts: 
(a) Takes against anoUlcr State 
measures of economic prcssure vio-
lating its sovereignty and ceonomic 
independcnce alld Uueatcning thc basis 
of its economic life; 
(b) Takes against anoUler Siale 
measures prcventing it from exploiting 
or nationalizing its own natural richcs: 
(e) Subjects another State to an 
economic blockade.26 
and ideological a/!/.,rre8sion: 
(a) Encourages war propaganda; 
(b) Eneoumgcs propaganda in favor 
of using atomic, bacterial, chemical 
and oUler weapons of mass dcstruc-
tion; 
(e) Promotcs the propagation of 
fascist-nazi views. of racial and national 
exclusivcnl'l'S, and of hatred and con-
tempt for oUlCr pcoples.27 
The U.S.S.R. also proposed acel~pt­
anee of a series of cOlllmon "excuses" 
used by aggressors in past incidences, 
but which would no longer be con-
sidered as justification of aggression. 
These criteria were divided into two 
categories. One was the internal position 
of the State under coercion and these 
included: 
(a) The backwardness of any nation 
politically, economically or culturally: 
(b) Alleged shortcomings of its 
administration: 
(c) Any danger which lIIay thrratrn 
thr lire or pr<Jpl'rty (If a1i('n$: 
(d) Any n'\"o\ntionary or l'ounh'r-
n'volulionary moven\l'nt, civil war, dis-
ordrT$ or strikes; 
(c) The establishment or main-
tcnanee in any State of any political. 
economic or social system.28 
The acLs or legislation within a State 
wcre also removed from possible con-
sideration as justification for aggression. 
Thcse acts included: 
(a) The violation of international 
treaties; 
(b) The violation of rights and in-
terests in the sphere of trade, conces-
sions or any other kind of economic 
activity acquired by another State or 
ils citizl'ns; 
(c) The mpture of diplomatic or 
economic relations; 
(d) Mea.."Ures in connection with an 
economic or financial boycott; 
(c) Repudiation of debts; 
(f) Prohibition or restriction of 
immigration or modification of the 
status of foreigners; 
(g) The violation of privileges 
granted to UlC official representatives 
of another State; 
(h) Refusal to allow the passage of 
anned forces proceeding to the terri-
tory of a third State; 
(i) Measures of a religious or anti-
religious nature: 
(j) Frontier ineidenls.29 
[n conclusion the Soviet definition pro-
vided: 
In the evrnt of the mobilization or 
concentration by another State of con-
~hlerabll~ armed forccs ncar its frontier, 
till' Stall' whirh i$ tlm'all'llI'll bv l'ndl 
aetiun shall have thl' righ t uf rc:eollT$!' 
to diplomatic or other means of secllr-
ing a peaecful settlcment of interim-
tional disputes. It may also in the 
meantime adopt requisite measures of 
a military nature similar to those dc-
scribed above, without, however, cross-
ing the frontier.30 
This Soviet definition is the arche-
type of the so-callcd "enumcrativc" 
definition which catalogs a widc range 
of ag:.rrcssivc situations. The Soviet for-
mat has remaincd stahlc since 1933, hut 
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the list has been expanded from the 
original five ovcrt military acLs to the 
(,lIffl'nl lil'1 of I!) whidl inl'ludl's the 
illllifl'l'I. ('I~OllOllli(·. aud id('ololJ;il'al ('ult'-
goril's of alJ;lJ;n~~ion. 
The second typc of definition ap-
proachcs the subject on a diffcrent tack. 
The abstract definition attempts to ex-
prcss the mcaning of aggrcssion in thc 
broad cst possible terms. An excellent 
example of the ahstract definition is 
that submitted by Mr. Ricardo Alfaro to 
the Intcmational Law Commission: 
Aggression is the usc of force by 
one State or group of States, or by any 
Government or group of Governments, 
against the territory and people of 
oUler States or .Governments, in any 
manncr, by any llleUlOds, for any 
reasons and for any purposes, except 
individual or collective self-defensc 
against anned attack or coercive action 
by the United Nations.3l 
[n this definition the "first to com-
mit" concept is absent, and it does lillIe 
to provide decisionmakcrs with specific 
guidance. 
A third variant is a "mixed" defini-
tion which includes an ahstract interpre-
tation of aggrcssion, followed hy an 
illustrative. hut brief, list of spccific 
instanccs of aggrcssion. 
IV--THE SOVIET DEFINITION VS. 
UNITED STATES POLICY 
In debates on dcfining agwession a 
large proportion of the "definers" aI-
"HIed to at least guarded approval of thc 
Soviet draft definition. It is apparcnt 
that if a definition is adopted thc 
substance of it will not operate allto-
matically on the facts of a particular 
case, and, indeed, the "facts" are not 
usually known in early stages of any 
United Nations debatc. It would none-
thelcss be useful to address the effect of 
an objective application of the defini-
tion to specific episodes of pasL {I.S. 
foreign policy machinations. In alldi-
tion, the broad implications of the 
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definition to the larger policies will be 
briefly examined. 
Broad Implications. The Charter or 
the United Nations states that til(! pur-
pose of the organization is "to take 
effective collective measures for the 
prevention and rellloval of threats to the 
peace, and for the :mpprcBSion of lIels of 
al!grcBSion or other breaches of the 
peace." L ~mphasis supplied.] 1 The 
charter further provides, under article 
51, for collective or individual sclf-
defense against an armed attack until 
the Security Council takes "measures 
necessary to maintain international 
peace and security."2 The United States 
has frequently resorted to measures 
outside the framework of the United 
Nations through our "sl'curity" al!rt'l'-
ments. This trend in J\ lII!'1"iclIn poliey 
was mentioned in a speech by Sccretary 
of State Dean Rusk in 1966 when he 
pointed out that the trend in U.S. 
policy when the machinery of the 
United Nations proved inadequate was 
to reinforce it with other measures.3 
In this context most of our involve-
ments are concerned with episodes in 
which we have a direct interest in the 
outcome of action against a government 
in power, either in overthrowing a gov-
ernment unfriendly toward the West or 
retaining in power one orien ted al!ainst 
cOlllmunism. These operations generally 
involve "the landing or leading of its 
land, sea or air forces inside the boun-
daries of another slate ... "4 in order 
to promote "lin internal uphellval in 
anotlll'r ~tatl' or a rI'vl"rsal (If poliey in 
favor of the aggressor."5 
In contrast, the Soviet Union, which 
amassed the /-,'Teatest territorial gains in 
the World War II period, has largely 
refrained from exporting her armed 
forces to areas of conflict. In areas 
where conflicts requiring force may 
occur, her armies are prepositioned and 
do not require the invasion denounced 
by her own definition. Instead. the 
rcsident Soviet forces can handle any 
internal difficulties which usually arise 
between the Soviet puppet govcrnment 
alill a l1onpupp!!l faction with dispatch, 
<11111 the entire affair c:an he rctaitwcl in 
the realm of an internal affair. 
Following is a brief investigation of 
the consequences of applying the sub-
stance of the Soviet definition to a 
series of foreign policy incidents in 
which the U.S. involvement precipitated 
a charge of "aggression" being levcled at 
this country in the United Nations. In 
examining these cases the basic facts of 
the case will be considered objectively 
against the definition with no aLlempt 
to "legalize" the U.S. position by apply-
ing the rationale adopted by the United 
States in defending her actions. 
Hungary. "That State shall be d('-
clared to have cOIllmitted an act of 
indirect aggression which: (a) en-
courages subversive activity against an-
other State; (b) promotes the outbrcak 
of civil war within anothcr State. The 
following may not be used as justifica-
tion [for the acts listed J: alleged short-
comings of its administration; any revo-
lutionary or counterrevolutionary move-
ment."6 Althou!h the Soviet Union 
could probahly be found guilty under 
her own definition, e1ause (d) "landing 
or leading of forces inside the boun-
daries 'of another State without the 
permission of the government of the 
latter," the question of whether the 
Nagy regime was in actual fact the head 
of government in Hungary is beyond the 
scope of this treatmcnt. In any event 
the Soviets claimed that their entry was 
in reaction to "indirect" agh'l"ession 
being committed in 1\ ungary by the 
United States. 
The campaign eondueled hy Badin 
Free Ellrope alld the Voiee of J\ meri('a 
had a decided effect 011 the revolution. 
For instance. Tihor i\1eray, a participant 
in the events, described the effect of the 
broadcasts as follows: On 24 Octo her, 
Premier Nagy called for "order, calm, 
discipline" and immediately thereafter 
" ... a vehement radio campaign was 
launchcd from ahroad against Nagy--a 
campail!n IhaL had a falal errecL on all 
lhal follnw,"\." On :n (klnher, Hadin 
FrI'" \o:urllP" 111:1111, lhl' fnlln\\'inl! pro-
nIlIllH~I'IIII'nt: "TIll' ;\lini:;trv of Ilt,fl'n:'" 
allll the !\linisLry of the In,terior art~ still 
in Com munisL hands. 1>0 noL leL this 
continuc, Frecdom FighLers, do not 
hang your weapons on the wall."7 Whcn 
considered in the context of thc sub-
stance of Lhe Soviet definition, the 
encouragement from the Voice of 
America and Radio Free Europe had 
considerable impact on the initiaLion 
and continuation of the revolt. The 
Hadio Free Europe broadcasts verifying 
Amcrica's willingness to hrlp, coupled 
with the U.S, inclination toward thc 
liberation of Europc, undoubtedly 
raiscd falsc hopes and had at least a 
sccondary effect on the events. Apply-
ing thc Soviet definition in its most 
literal scnsc, the United States could be 
found guilty of "indirect" aggression. 
China. The attacker is that state 
which "first commits the following act: 
Bomhardment by its land, sea or air 
forces of the territory of another 
state ... "8 
The U.S.S.R. charged that the United 
States had committed aggression and 
violation of Chinese airspace by bomb-
inl! Chincse territory. A total of 87 
flights had bcen lIIade over Red Chinese 
territory. The United States claimed 
that () I of the flights were reconnais-
!lance missions, and 110 bombs werc 
droppcd, and on othcr occasions hombs 
werc dropped 011 Yuill Hiver hridges 
thaL wcre not in Chinese territory. Two 
accidcntul at Lacks on Lhe Chinese main-
lanrl wcre aeknowledgl:d hy till: United 
SLates. In the light of the Sovid ddini-
tion, the United Statcs would have hcen 
fOil lid glliJ Ly 0 f agl,'l'essioll. 
Formosa. " ... that State shall be 
declared the attacker [aggressor] which 
first commits one of the following acts: 
... naval blockade of the coasts or 
ports of another State._ The follow~g 
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may not be used as justification: 
Any ... civil war; or the cstablishment 
nr ilia ill ten:tl\('(' ill UIIY State of :IlIY 
pnlilil'al. "('Olllllllie or ~(ll'ial :;y:;!t'III. "i) 
In 1'>!jO tlll~ U.S.S.H. all('I!("lthatthe 
United States was committing aggres-
sion in the blockade of ports belonging 
to Red China,lO and ill 1954 charged us 
with committing acts of aggression by 
attacking Red Chinese vessels on the 
high seas.!l Early U.S. policy enun-
ciated by President Truman declared 
The United States has no predatory 
designs on Formosa or any other Chi-
nese territory ... nor does it have any 
intention of utilizing its armed forces 
to interfere in the present situation. 
The United States government will not 
pursue a course which will lead to 
involvement in the civil r emphasis 
supplied] conflict in China)2 
Our subsequent action in ordering 
the 7th Fleet to act in restricting Chi-
nese naval operations and effectively 
"blockading" Chincse ports, in what we 
had previously acknowledged as a civil 
conflict, would have placed us in the 
position of a convicted "aggressor" 
when viewed in a strict interpretation of 
the Soviet definition. The United States 
contended that the blockade was not, 
per se, a blockade, since commercjal 
ship traffic was not interfered with.!3 
Cuba: Quarantine. An ag/:,'l'essor is 
the State which first commits the fol-
lowing act: "Naval blockade of the 
coasts or ports of another State." 
On 14 October a U.S. reconnaissance 
flight over Cuba detected the presence 
of medium-range ballistic missiles in 
Cuba,14 The President, in a radio ad-
dress, accused. the Soviet Union of 
deceiving the United States and an-
nounced plans to establish a naval 
quarantine of Cuba in order to prohibit 
the influx of additional offensive 
weapons,l5 Prior to the speech a fleet 
of 98 ships, including eight aircraft 
carriers, was prepositioned for im-
mediate implementation of the Presi-
dent's announced course of action)6 
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The first encounter with the· incoming 
Soviet ships occurrcd on thc sccond day 
of thc quarantine. The ship ('nterin/! the 
quarantine zonl! was a tanker, ohvioullly 
not carrying weapons. All other ~l)\'icl 
ships revcrsed coursc or halted short of 
the quarantine zonc. The result of the 
naval action and political prcssure was 
the promise of the Soviet (;overnmcnt 
to withdraw missiles from Cuha.l 7 
Under the Soviet definition of aggres-
sion, the preemptive first-strike type of 
warfare is specifically prohibited, and 
our action, under this definition, would 
have easily qualified as an act of aggres-
sion. 
Cuba: Bay of Pigs. The State which 
first commits thc following is guilty of 
aggression: "Support of armed bands 
organized in its own territory which 
invade the territory of another State." 
The following may not be used as 
excuses for aggrcssive acts against an-
other State: "Alleged shortcomings of 
its administration or any revolutionary 
movement. "18 
In 1960 the U.S. Government em-
harked on a plan to invade Cuba and 
overthrow the Communist government 
of Fidel Castro. A group of Cubans had 
been recruited hy the CIA in Miami and 
trained by CIA and U.S. military per-
sonnel in Guatemala.l 9 The United 
States was charged by Cuha in the 
United Nations with homhing Cuha, 
organizing, financing, and arming hands 
of Cubans in order to commit aggres-
sion. An anti-United Statcs rcsolution 
was introduced hy Itulllania and was 
adoptcd by the First Committee with a 
vote of 42 for, 31 against, and 25 
ahstentions. This rcsolution was rcjectcd 
by the General Assemhly hy a very 
narrow margin--41 for, 35 against, and 
20 abstentions.20 
On the morning of 17 April 1961, 
1,400 men of the American-trained 
Cuhan brigade landed at the Bay of Pigs 
in Cuha. Although the brigade consisted 
primarily of American-trained Cuhans, 
the first man ashore in the landing was 
an American. 
In this case our action was specifi-
c'ally lisle:cl as an dl'nwnt which l'olllci 
Imllld a nation the aggressor, and lIgain 
the Unitcd Statl's woule! have heen 
potentially guilty under the Soviet defi-
nition. 
Iran. The State will hc guilty of 
indirect aggression which first: "Pro-
motes the outbreak of civil war within a 
state" or "Promotes a reversal of policy 
in favor of the aggressor." A State will 
be guilty of economic aggression who 
"Takes against another State measures 
of economic pressure violating its sover-
eignty and economic independence and 
threatening the bases of its economic 
life" or "takes against another State 
measures preventing it from exploiting 
or nat i 0 nalizing its own natural 
riches. "21 
Iran, a destitute country struggling 
for survival, had a singular source of 
large-scale income: oil. Largely hecause 
of the unfavorable split of royalties 
between the Anglo-Iran Oil Company, 
which monopoli~ed oil resources in the 
country, and the government, Moham· 
med Mossadegh, a newly elected Prime 
Minister, on 1 I\Jay 1951 nationalized 
the company. Iranian control of the 
company was frustrated by a Western 
boycott of Iranian oil products. As Fred 
Cook stated in his article "The CIA," 
"The international oil cartel held firm--
and Iran lost all its oil revenues. "22 The 
loss of income had a severe effect on the 
regime of Prime I\Jinister Mossaclc/!h, 
and within 7 months he was overthrown 
by a eoup d'etat planned and executed 
by the CIA with rather wide puhlic 
knowledge of its activities. Over and 
above the CIA involvement, much 
covert military assistance was provided 
the rebels. In congressional hearings 
conducted in 1954, a Defense Depart-
ment official declared that: 
When the erisis came on and the Uling 
was about to collapse, we violated our 
normal criteria and among the oUler 
things we did, we provided the army 
immcdiately ['vith matcrial] on an 
cmcrgcncy basis ... the guns that thcy 
had in their hands, the trucks they 
rode in, the armored cars that they 
drovc through the streets, and thc 
radio communications that permitted 
their control, were all furnished [by 
the United States] .23 
The rm;ult of the coup was a govern-
ment favoralJle to the West and the 
internationalization of the Anglo-
Iranian Oil Company. Again, viewing 
the U.S. involvement in retrospect and 
in relation to the Soviet definition, the 
United States would have been guilty of 
aggression on several counts. 
Dominican Republic_ The State 
which first commits the following acts is 
guilty of aggression: Invasion by its 
armcd forces, even without the declara-
tion of war, of the territory of another 
State. The following may not be used as 
justification for the aggressive acts: Any 
danger which may threaten thc life or 
property of aliens or any revolutionary 
or counterrevolutionary movement.24 
On the afternoon of 24 April 1965, a 
radio station in Santo Domingo was 
siezed IJy a group of revolutionaries 
attempting to overthrow the regime of 
Donald Cabral in favor of the pro-
Communist .J uan Bosch. The rebels were 
attempting to inspire a general uprising 
from the populace.25 That same even-
ing a task group of U.S. Navy ships, 
headed by the carrier U.S.S.Boxer with 
five support ships, was alerted for pos-
sible action in the revolt. As the fighting 
developed the tide seemed to III: turning 
against the rebels, and the task group 
was ordered into position.26 The U.S. 
officials proposed to evacuate civilians 
from the embattled city and were 
promised immunity by both sides, the 
rebels and loyalist government. By the 
evening of 27 April, about 1,200 evacu-
ees, U.S. citizens, had been moved from 
the beach to units of the task force.27 
On that same day the rebcl position 
improved by their capture of the Presi-
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dential palace and stiffening resistance 
in other parts of the city .28 
The next day Ambassador Bennett 
reported that there were "Leftist 
forces" opposing a three-man military 
junta acceptable to both rebels and 
loyalists.29 This report also requested 
troop assistance prompted by a request 
from the junta for assistance in "pre-
serving the peace." The President, after 
receiving reports of possible danger to 
U.S. citizens, gave an order to land 
troops in the Dominican Republic. The 
task group commander stated during a 
news conference that the Marines were 
sent ashore to protect American lives 
and "to keep this a non-Communist 
government. "30 
Our troops, with a maximum streng-
th of about 20,000, actively cooperated 
with the loyalist government in suppres-
sing the rebel movement and effecting a 
cease-fire. The United States was subse-
quently accused of violating both the 
United Nations Charter and the OAS 
Charter. The resolution, introduced by 
Russia, would condemn the United 
States for its action and call for imme-
diate withdrawal of troops.31 
If the U.S. actions were considered, 
using the precepts of the Soviet defini-
tion, the United States would have been 
found guilty of aggression. 
V--POTENTIAL DANGER 
FOR AMERICA IN THE 
UNITED NATIONS 
The Danger of Definition. If a defini-
tion of aggression can exert any adverse 
effect on the goals of the United States 
and its posture in the world community, 
it will necessarily result from the defini-
tion being applied to our actions by a 
United Nations majority disenchanted 
with the U.S. machinations in world 
politics. In other words, because our 
policy is particularly suseeptihle to at-
tack hy an objective application of the 
Soviet definition, it will furnish a more 
54 
easily identifiable meehanism for indict-
ment of U.S. policies by a hostile 
United Nations memlH'r:;hip. For ex-
ample. it it' po::::::ihll' that in an incident 
involving the American usc of force, the 
United Nations mernher"hip could he 
presented with the facts of the case, and 
an application of the Soviet definition 
to these faels might indicate a clearly 
identifiable case of aggression. It is 
obvious that this procedure would not 
affect the votes of nations solidly back-
ing the U.S. position, but it could 
provide the impetus to push borderline 
cases to the anti-U.S. votes. The border-
line nations are those that are becoming 
increasingly alarmed with the handling 
of world affairs by the United Statrs 
and would welcome a bona fide excuse 
for voting against her. The ahility to 
provide a prima facie case of aggression 
against the United States could well 
provide the necessary excuse. 
Is the United States in a position to 
become a target of adverse reaction in 
the United Nations to aets of violence 
that are now conducted with impunity' 
in a legal framework? 
Early U.S_ Dominance. The past his-
tory of the United Nations is replete 
with examples of the United States 
posting significant political victorics 
over thc Communist minority. As thc 
major contrihutor to the United Nations 
hudget and a primary source of the 
world's foreign aid supply to smaller 
nations, the Unitcd States has been able 
to exercise enough influence to assure a 
favorahle vote, during the early years, in 
any matter of substance placed hefore 
thc United Nations. In regard to the 
Ceneral Assemhly, Ernest A. (;ross has 
offered evidence in the reeord of the 
United States: 
The Ameriean leadership reeord in 
this fomm is a proud one. In the years 
19·~6 through 1953 the General Assem-
bly adopted over BOO resolutions. The 
United States was defeated in less than 
3 per eent-and in no ease where our 
important seeurity interests were in-
volved. In these eight years only two 
resolutions supported by us failed of 
adoption.! 
The early predomin:llu'l! of the 
United Statcs dill not escape note hy 
the Soviet Union. V cry early in the 
Unitcd Nations existenec they cxplained 
their defcats by pointing out that the 
imperialh;ts were attempting to turn the 
United Nations into a branch of thc 
American State Department to imple-
ment their plans for "Anglo-Saxon 
domination."2 Many writers at that 
early stage warned of the steamroller 
tactics heing developed by the United 
States. 
Hints of U.S. Decline. In recent years 
it has become increasingly apparent that 
the early dominance of the United 
States would prohahly not continue 
unchecked. The inereasc in lIIemhl·rship 
of the United Nations has been pro-
gressing steadily, with new members 
consisting primarily of small ex-colonies 
with a latent hostility toward any eo-
lonial power--and the United States was 
branded a eolOllial power by associa-
tion, if not in fact.' In atIUition, U.S. 
policies in and out of the world organi-
zation seemed designed to antagonize 
the United Nations members and make 
the task of U.S. "Iobhyists" in gathering 
favorable votes e\'en more difficult. A 
harbinger of potential troublc for till' 
United States was \'oiced by Richard 
Gardner, whcn he stated: 
There is no ironclad guarantee for 
the Unitl'd States in thl' pf('scnt pro-
cedures of the Unitcd Nations. All one 
ean say with assurance is lhat the 
procedures are extreml'ly favorable to 
our eountry and that the authorization 
of a peace keeping action against our 
opposition is diffieldt to imagine, as-
suming always that the American posi-
tion is reasonably founded in justice 
[emphasis supplied] and Ule Unitcd 
Nations Charter.3 
1\1r. Gardner's statement alludes to 
the necessity of maintaining a position 
hased on justice, a key point in that a 
just position would easily become signi-
ficantly more difficult to maintain 
under Ihe manll!' of II\(, ~o\'il'l (ldini-
lion of al!~rrt'$$ion. 
The United ~Iates secmcd in mam' 
ways to earn its reputation as a chan~­
pion of colonialism mul, in 00 doing, 
alienate a large portiun of the Unitcd 
Nations vuting strcnglh--for cxamplc, 
our support of colonialism during the 
15th Session. In his report to Congress, 
Senator Wayne Morse pointed out that 
the United Slates either abstained or 
voted "no" on all the major colonial 
resolutions, and, in so doing, it had 
hrandcd itself as a supporter of colonial-
ism. lie pointed out as an example of a 
typical faux pas the American support 
of Portugal in claiming that her overseas 
holdings wcrc not tcrritorics but mctro-
politan provinces, thlls exempting her 
fl'OlII intcrnational intcrfcrcncc sincc 
dumestie law would apply. Senator 
I\lorse reported that he was confronted 
with many prolests or criticisllls of the 
U.S. vote by members who, although 
professing a strong desire to maintain 
friendship with the United States, found 
it increasingly difficult to do so. Senator 
Morse summed up our position as fol-
lows: . 
Yet, our vote on this resolution was 
so irreconcilablc with the clear mean-
ing of Articlrs 73 and 7·1- of the (I.N. 
Chllrter and with our proft'~l'd idl'ah, 
about supporting indigenous people in 
thcir stmggle for independcncc that 
many of our friell(l~ in the Fourth 
Committec were at a complete loss to 
IIInlrrsland our vote. They did not 
w:1Il1 to IH'Iil've what tlwy ft'art·d nllll 
suspccted, but they didn't hesitatc to 
tell me that they suspected that Penta-
gon influence, military bases, and the 
NATO alliance were the controlling 
factors that dictated the United States 
vote.4 
In a similar vote on a resolution 
calling for South West Africa to permit 
a suheommittee to visit the country and 
report on conditions, the United States 
abstained rather than vote for the ob-
viously anticolonial measure. As Senator 
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Morse reported, "The United States 
vote of abstention on this resolution 
\\'a$ Vl'ry harmful hl'l'ausr oner again we 
appt'an'd 10 Ill' sll~lail1il1g policies of II 
colonial power whose policy in South 
West Africa has aroused deep resent-
ment among many African Nations."!) 
Thc influx of new states, each with 
potentially hostile attitudes toward the 
United States, changed the complexion 
of the United Nations rather radically. 
When the organization was founded 
there was a total of 51 members, only 
two of which were from Black Africa: 
Ethiopia and Liberia. The membership 
now totals 117, with 33 African States 
who, combined with the Asian and 
Mid-East States, constitute over 50 per-
cent of the membership. This "Afro-
Asian" bloc, in combination with the 
Communist bloc, could theoretically 
command over 60 percent of the vote-
close to the two-thirds majority re-
quired for substantive issues. 
The. effects of our policies in the 
United Nations are obvious. A com-
monly used indicator of the U.S. in-
fluence in the Assembly, principally 
because it reCurs so often, is the vote on 
the perennial issue of seating the 
People's Republic of China. As reported 
in the International Review Service, 
Until 1955, votes for a postpone-
ment of consideration were carried 
with ease, there being at least three 
times as many votes in favor of the 
mora torium as those against. This 
situation gradually changed with the 
admission of new Member States, 
especially from Asia and Africa, aflt'r 
1953. In 1956, the votc favoring post. 
ponement was down to 2 to 1. This 
gap continued to narrow, and in 1960, 
the difference became a mcre 8 votes. 
Equally significant was the fact that all 
newly admitted African States either 
abstained from or opposed the annual 
U.S. proposal. A move by Nepal for 
the inclusion in the agenda of the 
question of Chinese representation was 
defcated by the difference of only 4-
votes.6 
In the 20th General Assembly a 
rcsolution calling for seating of Bcd 
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China rcsuILcd in a tic vote with ·l7 for 
and ·t7 ;l~ainst, in(licatin~ the si~nifi('ant 
weakening of the U.S. po:.:ition from it~ 
pre"ious position as the molder of 
United Nations voting patterns. An illus-
tration of this tn'lId against the Unitel) 
Statcs is provil)ed in table 1, whieh is a 
plot of the pcrcentage of nations voting 
with the United States as compared to 
the total number voting. 
During the framing of the United 
Nations Charter the American delega-
tion, in concert with the other great 
powers, insisted on inclusion of the veto 
power in the Security Council in order 
to insure that no peacekeeping action 
could he initiated against the major 
world powers. The framers recognized 
that any such collective security action 
was not in the interest of a stahle world 
situation. In later years the United 
States, viewing with horror the Soviet 
use of the veto in the Security Council, 
introduced the Uniting for Peace Reso-
lution to allow the General Assembly to 
act, under certain circumstances, in 
opposition to the veto of a permanent 
member. Although, at the time of its 
introduction, the action appeared 
sound, it was not universally applauded. 
Among those who professed concern 
was Inis Claudc, Jr., who stated that the 
United Nations " ... should not chal-
lenge a recalcitrant great power. "7 
At the time the llniting for Peace 
Resolution was adopted, it appeared. 
certa'in that it could never be turned 
a~ainst its creators lIeeause of huilt-in 
~fl'~uards. Not only did tlw United 
States have a distinct dominance in the 
General Assembly, but in the Security 
Council as well. One of the stipulations 
for implementing the Uniting for Peace 
Resolution is that the Security Council 
he paralyzed hy a veto and "fails to 
exercise its primary responsibility" in 
cases involving threats to peace, breach-
es of the peace or acts of agl,.rression. 
Since the United States has always becn 
able to obtain the support of a ~jority 
of Security Council members, it has 
hCl'n ahle to refrain from usinp; tlw veto 
power in eaSt'S inilllil'allo U.S. inll'fI'sls, 
therehy prel'llIplin~ applil'alion of the 
provisions of Uniting for Pl'aee. 
An analysis of the voting record in 
Security Couueil cases involving ehargl's 
of aggression against the United States 
indicates that although the United 
States has never been in jeopardy of 
having to veto a measure, an increas-
ingly narrow margin of votes is cast in 
favor of the United States. A graph of 
the voting record in seven complaints 
against America is shown in table II. 
Although the votinp; record of the Coun-
cil shows only a slight trend against U.S. 
interests, an analysis of Security Council 
debates provides an even greater insi@:ht 
into the decline of American influence. 
In the same seven cases, and in two 
others where no vote was taken, a 
tabulation of debating records was 
made, classifying countries as being in 
one of three categories: J'm-Ullited 
States, meaning that they participated 
actively in defending the United States 
position; Neutral, meaning that they 
either did not participate in debate, dr 
that they were noncommittal in defend-
ing U.S. actions; and Allti-United Slates, 
meaning they dehated actively against 
the U.S. position. The graph, shown in 
table Ill, is a tabulation of thcse re:::ult:::. 
The pattcrn :::hows the marked dccrl'u:>c 
in active support garnered by the United 
States in the SecuriLy Council during 
recent years. 
An inspection of the record indicatl'::: 
a trend away from Lhe U.S. po:;ition in 
the Security Council. The indications 
are that in future instances of interven-
tion the United States may well have to 
exercise its veto power in the Council to 
thwart action against its interests. In 
this case the Assembly will be in a 
position to act under the Uniting for 
Peace Resolution. Armcd with the So-
viet definition of aggression, the charge 
of aggression against the United StaLes 
could well be sllstained by an increas-
7th Session 
25 October 1952 85.7% 
8th Session 
27 Julv 1953 81.5% 
9th Session 
21 September 1954 79.6% 
10th Session 
20 September 1955 77.8% 
11 th Session 
16 November 1956 66.2% 
12th Session 
24 September 1957 64.0% 
13th Session 
25 September 1958 61.1% 
14th Session 
22 Seotember 1959 59.2% 
15th Session 
8 October 1960 53.2% 
16th Session 
14 December 1961 56.5% 
17th Session 
30 October 1962 57.2% 
18th Session 
21 October 1963 58.1% 
20th Session 
17 November 1965 50.0% 
TABLE I--ISSUE OF SEATING RED CHINA 
Per Cent Voting with United States in United Nations General Assembly 
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TABLE II--SECURITY COUNCIL CASES OF UNITED STATES AGGRESSION--VOTES 
Number of Pro-United States Votes 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
I 
130 January 1955 
I Offshore Islands 
18 April 1958 
l--.Ij,rctic;..pverfli!1hts 
15 July 1958 
Lebanon Intervention 
18 May 1960 
U_S.S.R.--Air Force Intervention 
11 July 1960 
Cuba--Aggression Overflight 
8 March 1962 I 
Cuba--OAS Enforcement Action 
28 April 1965 
U.S.S.R.-Dominican Intervention 
Source: Yearbook of the United Nations, 1955, 1958, 1960, 1962, 1965. 
9 10 11 
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TABLE III·-SECURITY COUNCIL CASES OF UNITED STATES AGGRESSION··DEBATE 
Members Debating Pro-United States 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
30 January 1955 
Offshore Islands 
18 April 1958 
Ar"ti"Overfliahts 
18 May 1960 
U,S.S.R.··Air ForceAClQression 
11 July 1960 
Cuba··Aaaression Overflight 
21 November 1961 .. Rpnllhli" IRrt. hIJ Cuba) 
8 March 1962 
Cuba··OAS Enforcement Action 
10 January 1964 
Panama 
16 April 1964 
Cambodia-U.S. Aaaression 
28 April 1965 
U.S.S.R.··Dominican Intervention 
Source: Yearbook'ofthe United Nations, 1955, 1958,1960,1961,1962,1964,1965. 




ingly hostile United Nations member-
ship. 
Pnbli(' Opinion in Ih(' World Ar('lIa. 
The ::;tren)!th of the llnitl'tI ~Iate::; in IIIl' 
United Nations is based primarily upon 
thc political poslllr,. of the mcmI,(T 
nations, bUl this political alignment is 
influenced profoulldly by public 
opinion within each individual member. 
In a recent article in U.S. News and 
World Report, the shift of altitudes of 
people in repre:;enlative nations of the 
world was found to be away from 
support of intemationalism. As an 
example, in a public opinion poll only 
28 percent of Britons favored helping 
the United States in a major crisis 
involving Russia, and only 21 percent 
favored support of the United States in 
Vietnam.S Similar loss of enthusiasm 
for American leadership was reported in 
Italy. The growing tide of resentment 
against U.S. foreign policy can be ex-
pected to produce an even further de-
cline of American influence in the 
United Nations during subsequent ses-
sions. 
VI--SUI\1l\lARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Unitcd Slates has, in recent 
years, pursued a policy of opposition ,to 
the concept of definin)! agl-Tfes:::ion lor 
usc in determining t he aggressor in ca,;es 
nnder consideration by thc United Na-
tions. The Soviet Union, on the other 
hand, has been instrumental in leadinl! 
the effort to adoI'I sueh a definition and 
repeatedly submilled its own draft 
definition enumerating various acts 
which could he considered clements of 
agl,Tfession. The clash of the two s\Jf~er­
powers on this issue raises the questIOn 
of whether or not the United States has 
accurately appraised the ramifications 
of adopting a definition by thc As-
sembly, and if opposition to the Soviet 
proposal is in the bcst interest of the 
United States. 
The United States has consistently 
maintailH'd the posilion Ihat al!l!ressive 
war is lolall\' olllsilll' il,; l'olil'y aim,; and 
ha,; dl'llolln~'I'd ;III~ IH'rl'l'Iralor of al!-
)!l'l':::"ion as an inl('walional criminal. 
This policy was steadfastly maintailH,d 
in the face of opposition of many other 
nations in the world community. The 
Russian and French delegations at the 
conference for development of the 
charter for the Nuremberg trials 
adopted a position that a general out-
lawry of aggressive war should not 
necessarily be the subject of codifica-
tion in the charter. 
The United States has stood in the 
van of the movement for outlawing 
aggressive war but, in recent years, has 
generally opposed attempts to define 
aggression, particularly ill the United 
Nations. The policy contrm.ts with early 
recognition of various definitions in 
treaties and conferences. Again, re-
ferring to the Nuremberg eonferenccs, 
the U.S. delegate favored inclusion in 
the charter of a definition almost iden-
tical to an earlier Russian proposal, and, 
in this instance,- the Itussian delegate 
opposed inclusion of a definition that 
Ori<nnated with his countrymen in 1933. e , 
In United Nalions deliberation!> on the 
definition, thc fir:>t of which occurred in 
1937, the United States adopted a 
O'cneral policv of opposition to the 
~ubject on !,rr'ounds that the definition 
was neither po!>sible nor desirahle. 
This policy was taken even though a 
majority of the memhers considered 
definition hoth possihle and desirahle. 
There was rathcr widespread dislIl,Tfee-
ment over the form of the definition. 
Those favoring defining were split into 
two basic camps: first, those who fa-
vored the Soviet definition, the "enu-
merative" type which categorized sev-
eral acts that constituted aggression. 
This tabulation was suhdivided into 
general, ideological, and . econo.mic 
aggression. The list of aggressive actIOns 
was followed by a series of situations 
which could not he used as excuses for 
agl,Tfession. The second !,TfOUp of "de-
fil\('rs" favored a rather hroad, ah:;tract 
definition lhal cmhr<tced only gencrill 
lwninoill/,-,), which could be liherally 
inlerpreted. 
The policy of the United Slates in 
opposing the concept of ucfinilion musl 
be considered in the context of how 
such a definition would affect American 
foreign policy, assuming thal the posi-
tion held by the United States was 
generated by valid causative factors, and 
not simply because the proposal was put 
forlh by the Russians. 
The basic tenet of the Soviet defini-
tion is that the first party to commit 
any of the various acts is the guilty one. 
These acts generally involve moving 
troops across bordcrs, attacking by 
other means, estahlishing blockades, 
supporl of arllled hands, or promotion 
of political upheaval in other Slales. 
The United States has traditionally 
intervened in cases where American 
inlerests were threatened by overlhrow 
of a friendly government or where 
eSlahlishment of a favorahle regime 
could he effecled. In lhis instance il has 
generally been necessary to make eilher 
overt or covert movements of troops 
and to attack by sea or airpower, in 
direct violation of the conditions of the 
Hu:;:;ian definition. 
The current prohlems besetting the 
Unite(1 Slalcs in its overseas troop COIII-
milmenls have dra:;lically reduced lhe 
in-counlry strenglh of her ,Armed 
Forces lhroughout the world and have 
produccd a situation that will rcquire 
even more obvious responses of the 
United States in crises involving her 
national interest. In contrast, the Soviet 
Union, heing a major conLinenlal power, 
can maintain Soviet or Soviet-controlled 
troops in potential trouble areas that 
can adequately cope with any develop-
ing situation. Under such conditions it 
wiII be generally U1mecessary for her to 
undertake the troop movements across 
international borders specifically pro-
hibited in her definition. Russia has 
instead espoused the principle of waging 
war through ideological campaigns 
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rather than furthering her national inler-
ests through direct military involve-
ment. 
In considering specific instances of 
United Slates foreign policy episodes 
against the Soviet definition, a large 
proportion of the events prove to be in 
direct conflict with the substance of this 
definition. A 'general review of incidents 
indicates that the U.S. actions could 
generally result in a finding of "guilty" 
against the United States. 
The implications of the definition are 
unimportant if the United States main-
tains her position as molder of world 
opinion and leader of the majority of 
the United Nations. The adverse effects 
of the definition could become opera-
tive in cases where the United SlaLes 
stands in a situalion where she is op-
posed in principle by a sufficient num-
ber of the member States. In these 
circumstances many of the borderline 
States normally amenable to American 
policies could be shaken from their 
traditional vote on the side of the 
United States by the clear violation of 
the criteria of aggression. This evidence 
in "hlack and white" could provide a 
suilable excuse for casting a vote for 
world order. 
An analysis of the record of the 
United Nations indicates that circum-
stances could arise where the U.S. inter-
ests would inueed be influcnced by 
declining powcr over member nations. 
In the General A:;seillbly the trend -.s 
definitely toward fewer nations voting 
with the United States on major issues. 
During the early phases of Unilcd 
Nations development no action could be 
taken against the U.S. interests regard-
less of "guilt" or "innocence" in any 
particular crisis. The Security Council 
was the only United Nations body that 
could enforce sanctions against offend-
ing nations, and the United States con-
sistently could muster a sufficient num-
her of votes to defeat any adverse 
action, even without the use of the veto 
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power given to the five permanen t 
members. The Americans had provided 
a means for bypassing the Security 
Council when action was precluded 
through the application of a veto. Th15 
provision, the Uniting for Peace Resolu-
tion, was intended primarily to provide 
for United Nations actions in the face of 
a Soviet veto. The United States has 
never had to use a veto in the Security 
Council, since enough votes could be 
garnered to defeat any resolution ad-
verse to United States interests. An 
investigation of the trends exhibited in 
the Security Council indicates that the 
leaden;hip of the Uniled Slales has 
declined in recent years. 
The overall implication is that the 
United Stales, in the face of gtc~aclily 
declining popularity in the worlel com· 
munity, could be confronted with con· 
demnation hy adverse world opinion in 
a situation involving the use of interna· 
tional force. Under these conditions the 
existence of a definition of aggression, 
particularly the enumerative type 
espoused by the Soviet Union, could be 
used as a lever to swing the vote of the 
United Nations membership against the 
United States. 
It is concluded that the policy of the 
United States in opposing the definition 
of aggression is in the best interests of 
her larger foreign policy, ancI that con· 
tinucd opposition in subsequent years 
will become increasingly important. 
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